1 00:00:19,670 --> 00:00:16,480 [Music] 2 00:00:23,659 --> 00:00:19,680 actually I was raised in Madison County 3 00:00:27,769 --> 00:00:23,669 I was raised down at Newmarket and went 4 00:00:32,269 --> 00:00:27,779 school out there went to I went to 5 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:32,279 Auburn got interested in a lady and she 6 00:00:37,310 --> 00:00:35,250 was an underclassman so I ended up 7 00:00:40,759 --> 00:00:37,320 staying at Auburn and getting a master's 8 00:00:43,009 --> 00:00:40,769 degree and and we eventually got married 9 00:00:45,890 --> 00:00:43,019 so you know things of all things worked 10 00:00:50,240 --> 00:00:45,900 out pretty good I graduated from high 11 00:00:55,250 --> 00:00:50,250 school here in 1953 so prior to that we 12 00:00:58,130 --> 00:00:55,260 moved to Huntsville when I was six years 13 00:01:00,770 --> 00:00:58,140 old my mom dad brought her dad in 14 00:01:04,090 --> 00:01:00,780 connect account II and so they moved up 15 00:01:08,179 --> 00:01:04,100 here data had his job with the state and 16 00:01:11,570 --> 00:01:08,189 it was during the war and so we knew 17 00:01:15,590 --> 00:01:11,580 things that was going on daddy then took 18 00:01:17,690 --> 00:01:15,600 us out to a new market and to keep me 19 00:01:21,230 --> 00:01:17,700 and my brothers and sisters off the 20 00:01:23,660 --> 00:01:21,240 streets of us feel and it was an old 21 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:23,670 grown over place and so they ended up 22 00:01:29,270 --> 00:01:26,610 putting us to work and that's the way we 23 00:01:32,810 --> 00:01:29,280 stayed out of trouble mother always had 24 00:01:36,230 --> 00:01:32,820 something for us to do well I got a BS 25 00:01:38,020 --> 00:01:36,240 degree in 57 there wasn't a really lot 26 00:01:41,630 --> 00:01:38,030 of people around knocking on my door 27 00:01:45,620 --> 00:01:41,640 trying to recruit me I'd found this girl 28 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:45,630 down there that I was dating and turned 29 00:01:51,469 --> 00:01:47,850 out I was started dating her and I was a 30 00:01:54,260 --> 00:01:51,479 senior and she's a freshman and so I had 31 00:01:56,120 --> 00:01:54,270 a friend of mine there my roommate he 32 00:02:00,649 --> 00:01:56,130 said well why don't we just go to 33 00:02:03,110 --> 00:02:00,659 graduate school and so we went over and 34 00:02:07,029 --> 00:02:03,120 checked and it turned out that at that 35 00:02:10,160 --> 00:02:07,039 point in time Albarn was just starting 36 00:02:13,190 --> 00:02:10,170 master's program in mechanical 37 00:02:16,759 --> 00:02:13,200 engineering and we just graduated with 38 00:02:20,960 --> 00:02:16,769 BS in mechanicals and they took a couple 39 00:02:23,720 --> 00:02:20,970 of us from Auburn and let us go into 40 00:02:26,920 --> 00:02:23,730 that graduating class and then I took a 41 00:02:29,649 --> 00:02:26,930 job down in Pensacola working 42 00:02:32,289 --> 00:02:29,659 or at that time Kim strand Monsanto 43 00:02:36,190 --> 00:02:32,299 later bought Amaya I came back up to 44 00:02:38,740 --> 00:02:36,200 Huntsville on on vacation from down 45 00:02:41,949 --> 00:02:38,750 there running to a guy dined you down at 46 00:02:44,199 --> 00:02:41,959 Auburn and he was asking me what I was 47 00:02:46,149 --> 00:02:44,209 doing I told him asked him what he's 48 00:02:50,500 --> 00:02:46,159 doing he told me he said you know that 49 00:02:52,690 --> 00:02:50,510 we're we're going and I have a space 50 00:02:55,599 --> 00:02:52,700 program said you need to come up here 51 00:02:57,490 --> 00:02:55,609 and get involved in that and I said I 52 00:02:58,960 --> 00:02:57,500 don't even know anybody there or 53 00:03:00,819 --> 00:02:58,970 anything about that 54 00:03:03,190 --> 00:03:00,829 he said well hey I'll give you an 55 00:03:06,009 --> 00:03:03,200 application and it said you fill it out 56 00:03:09,129 --> 00:03:06,019 and I'll take it in and put it in the 57 00:03:11,470 --> 00:03:09,139 right place and we'll see here where it 58 00:03:15,159 --> 00:03:11,480 goes turned out he was actually working 59 00:03:18,190 --> 00:03:15,169 for Chrysler at the time so I just made 60 00:03:21,699 --> 00:03:18,200 the application sent it in they called 61 00:03:23,500 --> 00:03:21,709 me a phone interview and I came came up 62 00:03:29,440 --> 00:03:23,510 and interviewed and went to work for 63 00:03:31,750 --> 00:03:29,450 Chrysler in December 1961 well when I 64 00:03:37,059 --> 00:03:31,760 was eloping I took all of my electives 65 00:03:39,250 --> 00:03:37,069 in structures materials and concrete and 66 00:03:43,420 --> 00:03:39,260 the ideas that I'm gonna be a stress guy 67 00:03:46,539 --> 00:03:43,430 you know take a job well when I come to 68 00:03:48,969 --> 00:03:46,549 Chrysler and told Chrysler I warned in 69 00:03:52,750 --> 00:03:48,979 the stress job they said we don't have 70 00:03:54,789 --> 00:03:52,760 any vacancies in that but we see that 71 00:03:57,249 --> 00:03:54,799 you've got a good background and and 72 00:04:00,249 --> 00:03:57,259 heat transfer and that type thing here 73 00:04:05,229 --> 00:04:00,259 so we have some work requirements in 74 00:04:07,059 --> 00:04:05,239 there and if we have an opening in the 75 00:04:10,229 --> 00:04:07,069 stress group and you're not happy and 76 00:04:14,020 --> 00:04:10,239 this fluid and thermal group where will 77 00:04:17,199 --> 00:04:14,030 will let you change you know and so I 78 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:17,209 started to work in a and the first job I 79 00:04:22,749 --> 00:04:20,570 had was designing a calorimeter that 80 00:04:26,830 --> 00:04:22,759 where you could determine what the heat 81 00:04:31,860 --> 00:04:26,840 flux was and so I was out trying to 82 00:04:36,310 --> 00:04:31,870 design and have built a prototype for a 83 00:04:39,610 --> 00:04:36,320 calorimeter and I don't think I know how 84 00:04:40,510 --> 00:04:39,620 to design but the guy come into my boss 85 00:04:44,529 --> 00:04:40,520 come into me 86 00:04:48,309 --> 00:04:44,539 in one day and said said hey said we've 87 00:04:51,369 --> 00:04:48,319 got a request from the government to 88 00:04:54,100 --> 00:04:51,379 send us some more people out on out on 89 00:04:57,460 --> 00:04:54,110 the arsenal and said you'd be out there 90 00:05:00,129 --> 00:04:57,470 working with NASA and you'd be on the 91 00:05:03,399 --> 00:05:00,139 arsenal and said we've already shown 92 00:05:05,800 --> 00:05:03,409 them your resume and they think you'd 93 00:05:10,899 --> 00:05:05,810 fit the bill are you willing to go out 94 00:05:12,670 --> 00:05:10,909 and interview well I said yeah I won I 95 00:05:15,850 --> 00:05:12,680 just getting started with them I didn't 96 00:05:18,100 --> 00:05:15,860 know anybody particular anything and so 97 00:05:20,830 --> 00:05:18,110 I went out there and they let me 98 00:05:23,710 --> 00:05:20,840 interview with a couple of guys what I'm 99 00:05:25,480 --> 00:05:23,720 was a external heat transfer we're doing 100 00:05:28,719 --> 00:05:25,490 base heating and that type of thing here 101 00:05:31,450 --> 00:05:28,729 which I knew nothing about and the other 102 00:05:34,450 --> 00:05:31,460 one was doing internal flow and heat 103 00:05:40,059 --> 00:05:34,460 transfer you know inside the mole on his 104 00:05:41,980 --> 00:05:40,069 vehicle and so they both said I they 105 00:05:44,140 --> 00:05:41,990 were I was acceptable they were both 106 00:05:47,350 --> 00:05:44,150 looking for people so I took the one 107 00:05:50,980 --> 00:05:47,360 with the internal flow in it in the 108 00:05:54,490 --> 00:05:50,990 vehicle in it in tanks I started to work 109 00:05:58,059 --> 00:05:54,500 in there and absolutely the first day I 110 00:05:59,740 --> 00:05:58,069 think I went in unto the job and it may 111 00:06:04,360 --> 00:05:59,750 not have been absolutely the first day 112 00:06:07,059 --> 00:06:04,370 but I walked into the office and the guy 113 00:06:10,769 --> 00:06:07,069 told him supervisor told me said well 114 00:06:15,040 --> 00:06:10,779 they ran a static test last night on SAT 115 00:06:18,879 --> 00:06:15,050 11 and said late in the burn said they 116 00:06:21,820 --> 00:06:18,889 lost tank pressure up to 11 psi second 117 00:06:25,120 --> 00:06:21,830 and said they're boarded to test he said 118 00:06:28,409 --> 00:06:25,130 go figure out what went wrong and I 119 00:06:32,260 --> 00:06:28,419 didn't know from nothing you know so but 120 00:06:35,700 --> 00:06:32,270 he said you know he said go down talk to 121 00:06:40,209 --> 00:06:35,710 him burglars and burglar had a 122 00:06:44,260 --> 00:06:40,219 experimental shop there in what's 46:10 123 00:06:47,019 --> 00:06:44,270 our four to six twelve now maybe and so 124 00:06:49,389 --> 00:06:47,029 I went down there and looking for some 125 00:06:51,899 --> 00:06:49,399 way I can make a a model that we could 126 00:06:53,679 --> 00:06:51,909 test the flow in it or something and 127 00:06:56,109 --> 00:06:53,689 walked in and if 128 00:06:58,509 --> 00:06:56,119 first guy I saw was the guy that led 129 00:07:01,359 --> 00:06:58,519 been in school but down over kind of 130 00:07:04,149 --> 00:07:01,369 named Hugh Campbell and he'd been up 131 00:07:06,609 --> 00:07:04,159 here a couple of three years and he took 132 00:07:08,859 --> 00:07:06,619 me in and says let's go see what we can 133 00:07:12,579 --> 00:07:08,869 find so we went out through the boneyard 134 00:07:17,559 --> 00:07:12,589 and you know he and I we picked up stuff 135 00:07:21,579 --> 00:07:17,569 plate made a flow test rig so we started 136 00:07:23,529 --> 00:07:21,589 running the tests and the way the flow 137 00:07:27,309 --> 00:07:23,539 was set up was running the tests on the 138 00:07:30,249 --> 00:07:27,319 Saturn one and so it has the center LOX 139 00:07:34,479 --> 00:07:30,259 tank and around the outside it's got 140 00:07:37,899 --> 00:07:34,489 full fuel and for oxidizer and from the 141 00:07:41,290 --> 00:07:37,909 outboard oxidizer tanks they fed the in 142 00:07:43,089 --> 00:07:41,300 inboard tank filled out bore tank well 143 00:07:45,399 --> 00:07:43,099 they were worried about getting flow 144 00:07:47,319 --> 00:07:45,409 when it comes from the inboard tank into 145 00:07:50,619 --> 00:07:47,329 the outboard thing they were worried 146 00:07:53,559 --> 00:07:50,629 about it having some to face flowing and 147 00:07:57,069 --> 00:07:53,569 entrained vapor so to keep that from 148 00:08:01,059 --> 00:07:57,079 happening they went in and ran the pipe 149 00:08:03,339 --> 00:08:01,069 up into any outboard tank well you don't 150 00:08:05,919 --> 00:08:03,349 have to be a genius to figure it out is 151 00:08:08,829 --> 00:08:05,929 that if you take a hose and stick it in 152 00:08:11,350 --> 00:08:08,839 the tub of water and point it up when 153 00:08:14,799 --> 00:08:11,360 you drop the level after a while that 154 00:08:20,040 --> 00:08:14,809 thing becomes a fountain and and we were 155 00:08:22,509 --> 00:08:20,050 using hot oxygen to pressurize the 156 00:08:25,959 --> 00:08:22,519 liquid oxygen when you sprayed that 157 00:08:27,850 --> 00:08:25,969 liquid oxygen into the Elledge area it 158 00:08:31,540 --> 00:08:27,860 just took all the heat out of the gas 159 00:08:36,069 --> 00:08:31,550 and the gas pressure just went like it 160 00:08:37,959 --> 00:08:36,079 fell off a cliff and so you know bingos 161 00:08:40,449 --> 00:08:37,969 within a week you know we had the 162 00:08:42,459 --> 00:08:40,459 explanation and I knew what was doing 163 00:08:45,160 --> 00:08:42,469 went out and looked at the literature 164 00:08:47,079 --> 00:08:45,170 and figure out what you do and so we 165 00:08:49,240 --> 00:08:47,089 went in and then and the solution to 166 00:08:51,519 --> 00:08:49,250 that what's go in and we paid up a 167 00:08:53,949 --> 00:08:51,529 little cool ahead you might have seen 168 00:08:56,290 --> 00:08:53,959 them it's a little diffuser type thing 169 00:08:58,900 --> 00:08:56,300 upside down and so as soon as the flow 170 00:09:01,689 --> 00:08:58,910 would come across and up it'd be 171 00:09:04,030 --> 00:09:01,699 reflected back down into the liquid 172 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:04,040 again and wouldn't spray up into the 173 00:09:10,900 --> 00:09:07,130 elegy area and so that became 174 00:09:16,060 --> 00:09:10,910 the the solution that they flew for the 175 00:09:18,370 --> 00:09:16,070 first the Saturn one flies the Saturn 176 00:09:20,710 --> 00:09:18,380 one bees when they came along different 177 00:09:24,280 --> 00:09:20,720 they changed the manifold in the bottom 178 00:09:25,840 --> 00:09:24,290 and and it put a sump on the bottom on 179 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:25,850 the outboard tanks where they could 180 00:09:33,600 --> 00:09:28,250 bring it into the sump sand just have to 181 00:09:36,280 --> 00:09:33,610 bring it in into the tank itself so uh 182 00:09:39,160 --> 00:09:36,290 but you know but we fixed it in a I 183 00:09:40,720 --> 00:09:39,170 found out what they need to be fix you 184 00:09:43,360 --> 00:09:40,730 know within a period of I don't know a 185 00:09:51,780 --> 00:09:43,370 week or so you know man we we were 186 00:09:59,190 --> 00:09:55,860 the only thing that we had to do 187 00:10:02,610 --> 00:09:59,200 analysis with was a slide rule and Ammar 188 00:10:04,640 --> 00:10:02,620 shot or Frieden calculators there wasn't 189 00:10:08,490 --> 00:10:04,650 anything else you know we went through 190 00:10:13,290 --> 00:10:08,500 college and learned how to use slide 191 00:10:16,530 --> 00:10:13,300 rules and the best thing about the slide 192 00:10:20,400 --> 00:10:16,540 rule in that process is you have to 193 00:10:23,430 --> 00:10:20,410 estimate the answer and so when you run 194 00:10:25,530 --> 00:10:23,440 it out you're going to just get you can 195 00:10:28,220 --> 00:10:25,540 read three digits maybe four did you 196 00:10:30,900 --> 00:10:28,230 chip you're really good you know and so 197 00:10:32,910 --> 00:10:30,910 what we really did then is you got to 198 00:10:35,790 --> 00:10:32,920 know where to put the decimal place so 199 00:10:38,280 --> 00:10:35,800 you got to go in and estimate the answer 200 00:10:42,390 --> 00:10:38,290 and have an idea of what that answer is 201 00:10:46,410 --> 00:10:42,400 in order to put the decimal place and so 202 00:10:49,530 --> 00:10:46,420 that gives us a feel for the numbers and 203 00:10:53,340 --> 00:10:49,540 the one thing that I've learned and it's 204 00:10:56,310 --> 00:10:53,350 been a great help over the years is I 205 00:10:58,290 --> 00:10:56,320 still have a feel for numbers you know 206 00:10:59,700 --> 00:10:58,300 you go in your stick something in a 207 00:11:01,730 --> 00:10:59,710 computer and you get something out of 208 00:11:04,260 --> 00:11:01,740 the computer you don't necessarily know 209 00:11:10,680 --> 00:11:04,270 where it's right and maybe you made a 210 00:11:19,890 --> 00:11:14,040 well the the big issue for the thing 211 00:11:22,770 --> 00:11:19,900 here when we were working and the German 212 00:11:25,680 --> 00:11:22,780 team was here but their one goal and 213 00:11:27,780 --> 00:11:25,690 they want to go into the moon they they 214 00:11:31,020 --> 00:11:27,790 wanted to and they thought they might be 215 00:11:33,900 --> 00:11:31,030 but hey they won the military dictated 216 00:11:36,600 --> 00:11:33,910 that they could only work on things with 217 00:11:40,740 --> 00:11:36,610 a certain range and this type of thing 218 00:11:45,120 --> 00:11:40,750 here and when I guess Kennedy got 219 00:11:49,320 --> 00:11:45,130 involved with the things in in Cuba and 220 00:11:51,510 --> 00:11:49,330 then he had the Soviets pressing him and 221 00:11:54,150 --> 00:11:51,520 that type of thing here they thought he 222 00:11:56,280 --> 00:11:54,160 was a young kid and he you know they 223 00:12:00,390 --> 00:11:56,290 could take advantage of it he had to do 224 00:12:02,460 --> 00:12:00,400 something to keep the Europeans aligned 225 00:12:03,900 --> 00:12:02,470 with us rather they'll have them go all 226 00:12:08,610 --> 00:12:03,910 line up with the Russians 227 00:12:10,500 --> 00:12:08,620 so his idea and his advisors ideas was 228 00:12:14,670 --> 00:12:10,510 they go to the moon 229 00:12:18,800 --> 00:12:14,680 now when that did that really turned the 230 00:12:22,490 --> 00:12:18,810 Germans loose but from our perspective 231 00:12:25,790 --> 00:12:22,500 it turned out that we started designing 232 00:12:30,630 --> 00:12:25,800 was part of the design effort to design 233 00:12:33,540 --> 00:12:30,640 the Saturn 5 the Saturn 1b one go 1 1 b1 234 00:12:36,690 --> 00:12:33,550 will be big enough to go to the moon and 235 00:12:40,410 --> 00:12:36,700 so they started out and they had the f1 236 00:12:42,870 --> 00:12:40,420 engine that was in test and so we 237 00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:42,880 started designing they they baseline 238 00:12:49,410 --> 00:12:45,090 that engine and we started designing it 239 00:12:52,800 --> 00:12:49,420 as our job to design the feed systems 240 00:12:56,090 --> 00:12:52,810 the pressurization systems the things 241 00:12:58,500 --> 00:12:56,100 that how you get propellants on the 242 00:13:00,960 --> 00:12:58,510 vehicle and from the ground and how you 243 00:13:05,040 --> 00:13:00,970 get them and satisfy the engine 244 00:13:07,530 --> 00:13:05,050 requirements what sort of pressures you 245 00:13:10,830 --> 00:13:07,540 design and provide so that you can 246 00:13:13,830 --> 00:13:10,840 maintain structural integrity from both 247 00:13:17,310 --> 00:13:13,840 collapse and overpressure so those were 248 00:13:20,250 --> 00:13:17,320 all issues that we were designing I 249 00:13:22,570 --> 00:13:20,260 personally was designing primarily the 250 00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:22,580 fuel system the 251 00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:26,940 s1c and they say there's a c11 f1 252 00:13:31,430 --> 00:13:28,410 anything that was enough had to make 253 00:13:34,250 --> 00:13:31,440 twos now we had a c2 is 2f once you know 254 00:13:36,890 --> 00:13:34,260 and then eventually they every time you 255 00:13:42,620 --> 00:13:36,900 know we kept the same type designs but 256 00:13:43,730 --> 00:13:42,630 then we multiply and feed systems here 257 00:13:45,260 --> 00:13:43,740 but now we've got another one right 258 00:13:47,210 --> 00:13:45,270 beside it and then we've got another one 259 00:13:49,190 --> 00:13:47,220 over here and they've got another one 260 00:13:52,750 --> 00:13:49,200 over here I'm assuming we had four and 261 00:13:55,910 --> 00:13:52,760 we were designing it at all they were 262 00:13:58,250 --> 00:13:55,920 individually designed but then you had 263 00:14:01,010 --> 00:13:58,260 to put them collectively and integrate 264 00:14:04,730 --> 00:14:01,020 them and how do you control all the 265 00:14:06,610 --> 00:14:04,740 flows and pressures and and that type of 266 00:14:10,100 --> 00:14:06,620 thing yes so what that we were working 267 00:14:12,200 --> 00:14:10,110 that and then the great thing that they 268 00:14:15,530 --> 00:14:12,210 really do it is they decided to go and 269 00:14:18,110 --> 00:14:15,540 fill that middle spot with v engine and 270 00:14:24,629 --> 00:14:18,120 now we had all sorts of margins from 271 00:14:34,739 --> 00:14:28,919 you got the basic theories you got heat 272 00:14:36,809 --> 00:14:34,749 transfer and you got fluid flow 273 00:14:38,939 --> 00:14:36,819 conditions you can calculate fluid 274 00:14:41,119 --> 00:14:38,949 didn't making difference where what size 275 00:14:44,489 --> 00:14:41,129 the pipe is is just the numbers change 276 00:14:45,809 --> 00:14:44,499 but the process is the same and it's 277 00:14:49,769 --> 00:14:45,819 kind of the same way with the heat 278 00:14:54,329 --> 00:14:49,779 transfer you got the heat transfer you 279 00:14:57,229 --> 00:14:54,339 if you go through natural convection you 280 00:15:00,509 --> 00:14:57,239 got force convection you just figure out 281 00:15:02,519 --> 00:15:00,519 if you want to know how much heat you're 282 00:15:05,129 --> 00:15:02,529 going to transfer on the sidewall of the 283 00:15:09,210 --> 00:15:05,139 tank you go in and look for data in the 284 00:15:11,970 --> 00:15:09,220 literature for vertical surfaces and and 285 00:15:15,090 --> 00:15:11,980 so there's lots of data out there the 286 00:15:17,999 --> 00:15:15,100 the trick is and and the data has got 287 00:15:21,569 --> 00:15:18,009 plus or minus 20% only generally because 288 00:15:24,059 --> 00:15:21,579 that's the way you take data in the ways 289 00:15:26,910 --> 00:15:24,069 they would in a literature and so we go 290 00:15:29,220 --> 00:15:26,920 out and we'd guess the answer it's about 291 00:15:31,019 --> 00:15:29,230 we assume it's about like this and we're 292 00:15:33,419 --> 00:15:31,029 running numbers on it and then we go out 293 00:15:36,329 --> 00:15:33,429 and try to configure a test someplace 294 00:15:39,629 --> 00:15:36,339 that see if we can get a better number 295 00:15:42,239 --> 00:15:39,639 and see if we can squeeze down the 296 00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:42,249 variation is not plus amount of 20 it's 297 00:15:49,379 --> 00:15:46,720 plus a minus another smaller number but 298 00:15:52,139 --> 00:15:49,389 you you just keep reassuring yourself as 299 00:15:55,109 --> 00:15:52,149 you go along that the assumptions that 300 00:15:57,539 --> 00:15:55,119 you're making is good assumptions and 301 00:15:59,999 --> 00:15:57,549 after a while you've got the data that 302 00:16:01,559 --> 00:16:00,009 says instead of them you know we 303 00:16:06,950 --> 00:16:01,569 wandered around a little bit then but 304 00:16:15,110 --> 00:16:10,970 the Pogo problem was unforeseen we 305 00:16:16,970 --> 00:16:15,120 designed the feed systems and connected 306 00:16:22,010 --> 00:16:16,980 them to the engines and connected them 307 00:16:25,449 --> 00:16:22,020 to the structure and and all and we 308 00:16:29,449 --> 00:16:25,459 ground test-fired them but we didn't 309 00:16:32,990 --> 00:16:29,459 have any idea that there could be a 310 00:16:35,990 --> 00:16:33,000 coupling and an instability between the 311 00:16:38,389 --> 00:16:36,000 propulsion system and the structure in 312 00:16:42,710 --> 00:16:38,399 fact the Bennets the first thing that 313 00:16:44,570 --> 00:16:42,720 really come to our realization when the 314 00:16:47,300 --> 00:16:44,580 guys tell you about gourd and plant he 315 00:16:50,800 --> 00:16:47,310 read Aviation Week and he saw the in 316 00:16:54,560 --> 00:16:50,810 eleven failure on the Titan too and if 317 00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:54,570 it had a long feed line on it and he 318 00:16:59,210 --> 00:16:56,610 came in one morning and we started 319 00:17:02,050 --> 00:16:59,220 talking about maybe that long feed line 320 00:17:03,470 --> 00:17:02,060 has something to do with this 321 00:17:06,710 --> 00:17:03,480 instability 322 00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:06,720 now we don't calculate the feeds on 323 00:17:11,809 --> 00:17:10,170 frequency stored one at that time but 324 00:17:17,419 --> 00:17:11,819 the structures guys knew what their 325 00:17:21,290 --> 00:17:17,429 frequencies was and so Gordon says get 326 00:17:23,990 --> 00:17:21,300 on the plane find some guys at Denver go 327 00:17:27,380 --> 00:17:24,000 out and talk to those guys and let us 328 00:17:29,990 --> 00:17:27,390 let them see fat as likely to have be a 329 00:17:31,130 --> 00:17:30,000 problem that we had I get on the plane 330 00:17:34,280 --> 00:17:31,140 we go to Denver 331 00:17:38,810 --> 00:17:34,290 nicest guys you have want to meet they 332 00:17:40,970 --> 00:17:38,820 take we ended they for me with our 333 00:17:43,190 --> 00:17:40,980 configuration some I showed him sketches 334 00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:43,200 for the rest of it they cared me out 335 00:17:48,650 --> 00:17:46,410 they walked me through there how they 336 00:17:50,510 --> 00:17:48,660 did it an ALICE they were walk me 337 00:17:53,870 --> 00:17:50,520 through how they did their test program 338 00:17:57,549 --> 00:17:53,880 carried me up to this test and zonah on 339 00:17:59,870 --> 00:17:57,559 the hill took me in and showed me the 340 00:18:01,430 --> 00:17:59,880 accumulators that they were building and 341 00:18:05,780 --> 00:18:01,440 the stand pipes that they were building 342 00:18:08,090 --> 00:18:05,790 the solved their problem and where they 343 00:18:13,310 --> 00:18:08,100 changed the designs of the feed line you 344 00:18:19,669 --> 00:18:13,320 know and and so they give us a running 345 00:18:23,510 --> 00:18:19,679 start but this was probably 1964 346 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:23,520 we're always cutting hardware components 347 00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:26,330 are out on design 348 00:18:35,270 --> 00:18:32,850 you can't analyze stability you can lies 349 00:18:39,549 --> 00:18:35,280 it but you can't find out stability as 350 00:18:42,289 --> 00:18:39,559 long as it's on the ground because the 351 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:42,299 hold-down clamps are all this keeps the 352 00:18:46,180 --> 00:18:44,850 company occur you're only gonna see it 353 00:18:52,060 --> 00:18:46,190 in fight 354 00:18:56,450 --> 00:18:52,070 so I Marshall hardly Martin guys and 355 00:18:59,120 --> 00:18:56,460 they hired some put together a pogo team 356 00:19:04,100 --> 00:18:59,130 to go off and work it we've got out on 357 00:19:07,190 --> 00:19:04,110 the lab out here and we figured out what 358 00:19:09,770 --> 00:19:07,200 the feed line frequency is we found the 359 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:09,780 feed line frequency out by thinking of 360 00:19:14,590 --> 00:19:11,610 the scylla gram and rolling it down in 361 00:19:16,940 --> 00:19:14,600 the hall I sarin test area and then 362 00:19:20,060 --> 00:19:16,950 expanding it greatly and then going 363 00:19:22,659 --> 00:19:20,070 through and reading the times what the 364 00:19:25,159 --> 00:19:22,669 frequency was and is the frequent change 365 00:19:27,770 --> 00:19:25,169 we go in and looked and see what was 366 00:19:30,380 --> 00:19:27,780 happening on pump Inlet condition and we 367 00:19:32,990 --> 00:19:30,390 had a plot of frequency versus pump 368 00:19:36,409 --> 00:19:33,000 Inlet filling the problems we went and 369 00:19:38,930 --> 00:19:36,419 we was right but it was the only data 370 00:19:42,500 --> 00:19:38,940 that we had and it came off a real 371 00:19:47,780 --> 00:19:42,510 system so we began to use it and did the 372 00:19:52,190 --> 00:19:47,790 do the analysis and it turns out that we 373 00:19:54,890 --> 00:19:52,200 had a an analysis that they won't should 374 00:19:58,700 --> 00:19:54,900 have like sixty B's of stability that's 375 00:20:04,400 --> 00:19:58,710 a factor of two well our analysis was 376 00:20:07,370 --> 00:20:04,410 showing about 1 DB of stability now it 377 00:20:09,650 --> 00:20:07,380 turns out that you know normally that 378 00:20:11,930 --> 00:20:09,660 wouldn't be very much but you know how 379 00:20:16,640 --> 00:20:11,940 good our model was we didn't know how 380 00:20:18,950 --> 00:20:16,650 good the propulsion data was I knew 381 00:20:20,480 --> 00:20:18,960 where I got it from and I was pretty 382 00:20:22,700 --> 00:20:20,490 confident in it I just didn't know were 383 00:20:24,289 --> 00:20:22,710 they exactly right a lot and then the 384 00:20:26,620 --> 00:20:24,299 structures guys they had pretty good 385 00:20:29,659 --> 00:20:26,630 data because they drawn the dynamic test 386 00:20:32,360 --> 00:20:29,669 vehicle and had their structure design 387 00:20:34,100 --> 00:20:32,370 and it normally couples for the first 388 00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:34,110 so they've heard they knew what that 389 00:20:40,340 --> 00:20:36,890 that was so we had a pretty good 390 00:20:41,540 --> 00:20:40,350 analysis except we didn't know where it 391 00:20:44,290 --> 00:20:41,550 was any good 392 00:20:48,650 --> 00:20:44,300 we won't a plane going down to the Cape 393 00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:48,660 for the L minus two day review and von 394 00:20:55,610 --> 00:20:53,850 Braun said let me see your charts so we 395 00:20:57,260 --> 00:20:55,620 gave him the charts and he was flipping 396 00:20:59,390 --> 00:20:57,270 through the charts and this type of 397 00:21:02,450 --> 00:20:59,400 thing here and when he came to that 398 00:21:04,190 --> 00:21:02,460 disability plot well that came down 399 00:21:07,640 --> 00:21:04,200 short and getting less and less as a 400 00:21:10,070 --> 00:21:07,650 pill and then finally going back and 401 00:21:15,770 --> 00:21:10,080 getting more stability again and it a 402 00:21:17,690 --> 00:21:15,780 minimum instant built out about 120 125 403 00:21:19,820 --> 00:21:17,700 seconds in that general timeframe my own 404 00:21:24,140 --> 00:21:19,830 memory exact number but von Braun said 405 00:21:26,150 --> 00:21:24,150 that won't never go and he said maybe we 406 00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:26,160 can take this area down here and we can 407 00:21:33,140 --> 00:21:29,930 crosshatch the aryans and argue that 408 00:21:35,540 --> 00:21:33,150 this is the range of the things here and 409 00:21:40,460 --> 00:21:35,550 charts it's got the curve on it that's 410 00:21:42,800 --> 00:21:40,470 just the worst case and so I had the job 411 00:21:45,560 --> 00:21:42,810 of going Andry plot in that chart and 412 00:21:49,250 --> 00:21:45,570 the guy that was making the presentation 413 00:21:51,770 --> 00:21:49,260 there he was made the presentation I got 414 00:21:53,480 --> 00:21:51,780 the charts made and I slipped it into 415 00:21:56,360 --> 00:21:53,490 the stack of charts where it was 416 00:21:58,310 --> 00:21:56,370 supposed to come up at and he was going 417 00:22:02,540 --> 00:21:58,320 on to his presentation until he come to 418 00:22:05,930 --> 00:22:02,550 that chart and boy it hit the fan and it 419 00:22:08,840 --> 00:22:05,940 was a roar in the room everybody was 420 00:22:16,990 --> 00:22:08,850 trying to talk it once and you know and 421 00:22:20,030 --> 00:22:17,000 so finally they they kind of agreed that 422 00:22:23,420 --> 00:22:20,040 that was there there was I was the case 423 00:22:24,890 --> 00:22:23,430 we didn't know how much margin it was we 424 00:22:26,930 --> 00:22:24,900 hadn't seen his on the ground because 425 00:22:29,330 --> 00:22:26,940 you can't see it on the ground and we 426 00:22:32,720 --> 00:22:29,340 hadn't had a flight yet and the first 427 00:22:38,120 --> 00:22:32,730 flight was going to be unmanned and so 428 00:22:41,060 --> 00:22:38,130 they decided we'll fly and we did and it 429 00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:41,070 turns out that we got very little 430 00:22:44,790 --> 00:22:44,010 instability but at the time we predicted 431 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:44,800 men 432 00:22:52,620 --> 00:22:48,570 instability we got a little bit of 433 00:22:56,370 --> 00:22:52,630 vibration there and it's showed up and 434 00:22:58,260 --> 00:22:56,380 it turns out that they had from this 435 00:23:02,630 --> 00:22:58,270 heightened program they had worked and 436 00:23:05,490 --> 00:23:02,640 said that for the crew to be safe the 437 00:23:09,390 --> 00:23:05,500 vibration needs to be less than a 438 00:23:11,760 --> 00:23:09,400 quarter of a chi now we were below 439 00:23:13,680 --> 00:23:11,770 Accord over G I don't remember the exact 440 00:23:19,260 --> 00:23:13,690 number but we were less than a quarter G 441 00:23:21,240 --> 00:23:19,270 so it wasn't a big issue and so we ended 442 00:23:23,070 --> 00:23:21,250 up on the second flight we were 443 00:23:25,290 --> 00:23:23,080 basically went back through it again 444 00:23:28,080 --> 00:23:25,300 now the structure changed a little bit 445 00:23:30,240 --> 00:23:28,090 on the second flight the propulsion and 446 00:23:33,690 --> 00:23:30,250 the engines they were different but they 447 00:23:35,700 --> 00:23:33,700 were the same and so it turns out that 448 00:23:41,310 --> 00:23:35,710 on the on the second flight which was 449 00:23:42,390 --> 00:23:41,320 also unmanned we had a kind of a 450 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:42,400 disaster 451 00:23:48,570 --> 00:23:45,250 on the whole thing first stage had a 452 00:23:51,540 --> 00:23:48,580 Pogo problem the second stage had one 453 00:23:53,100 --> 00:23:51,550 engine go out and when that one engine 454 00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:53,110 went out there were wires will cross 455 00:23:57,180 --> 00:23:55,930 today that pre valve shut and then when 456 00:23:59,700 --> 00:23:57,190 that was when I was going to acting shut 457 00:24:04,130 --> 00:23:59,710 the pre valve and already failed and so 458 00:24:10,260 --> 00:24:04,140 we had two engines out and then when the 459 00:24:13,500 --> 00:24:10,270 s4b start and it burned into own into 460 00:24:16,020 --> 00:24:13,510 orbit so and I think we had a panel to 461 00:24:19,290 --> 00:24:16,030 come off the slaw boy hi something like 462 00:24:23,490 --> 00:24:19,300 it so you know every stage had something 463 00:24:26,070 --> 00:24:23,500 go wrong and then they either right 464 00:24:28,740 --> 00:24:26,080 before right as they were in to they 465 00:24:31,670 --> 00:24:28,750 announced at the first flight next 466 00:24:35,100 --> 00:24:31,680 flight was go away all up in man's and 467 00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:35,110 so you know we got this problem now 468 00:24:41,310 --> 00:24:36,730 because on the second flight we showed a 469 00:24:46,020 --> 00:24:41,320 bigger instability and so now we had had 470 00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:46,030 to fix it and so it was fortunate we had 471 00:24:51,420 --> 00:24:48,730 and knew we might have a problem we'd 472 00:24:53,490 --> 00:24:51,430 already been working on fixes but nobody 473 00:24:55,030 --> 00:24:53,500 would let us implement it because they 474 00:24:57,730 --> 00:24:55,040 won sure we had a 475 00:25:02,080 --> 00:24:57,740 problem but we've been working on fence 476 00:25:04,420 --> 00:25:02,090 fixes up putting a gas in the line to 477 00:25:06,310 --> 00:25:04,430 change the feed line frequency you can't 478 00:25:09,160 --> 00:25:06,320 change your structure frequency it 479 00:25:10,750 --> 00:25:09,170 caused too much weight you know and so 480 00:25:12,490 --> 00:25:10,760 you got to change your propulsion 481 00:25:15,550 --> 00:25:12,500 frequency and you really can't change 482 00:25:18,100 --> 00:25:15,560 the engine itself because it's designed 483 00:25:22,390 --> 00:25:18,110 and qualified so you got to change 484 00:25:25,030 --> 00:25:22,400 something that's easy to change compared 485 00:25:28,300 --> 00:25:25,040 to those who and it's feed line turned 486 00:25:30,430 --> 00:25:28,310 out that we found we knew that - we 487 00:25:32,920 --> 00:25:30,440 could put helium in and we went so far 488 00:25:35,200 --> 00:25:32,930 as to know if we let that helium get out 489 00:25:37,600 --> 00:25:35,210 and got into the engine it wouldn't 490 00:25:40,960 --> 00:25:37,610 cause any problems so we knew that one 491 00:25:44,170 --> 00:25:40,970 an issue so we ended up on the third 492 00:25:46,900 --> 00:25:44,180 flight putting some helium in a in the 493 00:25:49,210 --> 00:25:46,910 prevail and the pre valve is a visor 494 00:25:53,890 --> 00:25:49,220 valve and it's got a cavity behind the 495 00:25:56,800 --> 00:25:53,900 floor liner so we could put the helium 496 00:25:59,080 --> 00:25:56,810 in and it worked like a charm I mean it 497 00:26:02,530 --> 00:25:59,090 was and you know it's well thank you 498 00:26:04,030 --> 00:26:02,540 just got lucky all but part of our luck 499 00:26:07,290 --> 00:26:04,040 was due to work because we'd been 500 00:26:10,120 --> 00:26:07,300 working and looking for a solution that 501 00:26:13,390 --> 00:26:10,130 didn't have fuss to either do that to 502 00:26:18,140 --> 00:26:13,400 completely redesign the vehicle turned 503 00:26:24,100 --> 00:26:22,220 I guess the first flight had really give 504 00:26:28,159 --> 00:26:24,110 us a lot of confidence in our analysis 505 00:26:30,260 --> 00:26:28,169 it had the had the frequency and had the 506 00:26:32,029 --> 00:26:30,270 minimum stability and right where we 507 00:26:35,779 --> 00:26:32,039 predicted it would be at so we had a 508 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:35,789 good good confidence in it so we then 509 00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:38,610 had good confidence that if we change 510 00:26:44,890 --> 00:26:42,210 that frequency on the feed system it 511 00:26:49,820 --> 00:26:44,900 should decouple those system so we had 512 00:26:51,940 --> 00:26:49,830 had felt good about our fix and we knew 513 00:26:54,649 --> 00:26:51,950 that it had worked on the Jim and I are 514 00:26:58,279 --> 00:26:54,659 similar things had worked on the Jim and 515 00:27:00,560 --> 00:26:58,289 I so we had that confidence going far we 516 00:27:03,169 --> 00:27:00,570 had the Martin company and the other 517 00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:03,179 companies come in and they knew what we 518 00:27:07,970 --> 00:27:05,610 were doing and they looked at it and 519 00:27:11,740 --> 00:27:07,980 they agreed that that's a good solution 520 00:27:15,080 --> 00:27:11,750 so when we got ready to to fly that 521 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:15,090 first manned flight we had confidence in 522 00:27:23,340 --> 00:27:18,210 that s1c stage polk over not been a 523 00:27:33,169 --> 00:27:28,409 I'm pretty even keel I have a bit of a 524 00:27:37,049 --> 00:27:33,179 personal philosophy if you have an issue 525 00:27:39,750 --> 00:27:37,059 you work the issue before the flight and 526 00:27:42,570 --> 00:27:39,760 if you now don't have your issue solved 527 00:27:46,710 --> 00:27:42,580 before the flight you know you can't fly 528 00:27:49,500 --> 00:27:46,720 and and if you agree to fly then the 529 00:27:52,200 --> 00:27:49,510 issue is in the control as far as I can 530 00:27:55,769 --> 00:27:52,210 do I've done really all I can do I can't 531 00:28:00,000 --> 00:27:55,779 do anymore I've done this now we got to 532 00:28:03,509 --> 00:28:00,010 go fight and so I didn't I didn't really 533 00:28:05,190 --> 00:28:03,519 worry about about flights and I know a 534 00:28:07,440 --> 00:28:05,200 lot of people go in and wring their 535 00:28:10,830 --> 00:28:07,450 hands and and all that but and it was 536 00:28:14,190 --> 00:28:10,840 one of those guys I'm gonna work hard 537 00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:14,200 and I'm gonna fix it if when I say we're 538 00:28:23,510 --> 00:28:17,010 ready to go I don't have any open issues 539 00:28:29,090 --> 00:28:26,060 the guy went to work for after I came 540 00:28:32,020 --> 00:28:29,100 when I first came in from Chrysler kind 541 00:28:38,210 --> 00:28:32,030 of named Charles who would Charles was a 542 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:38,220 older guy that I was went over but he 543 00:28:42,680 --> 00:28:41,850 went to worked up at Langley and worked 544 00:28:47,140 --> 00:28:42,690 perfectly 545 00:28:52,400 --> 00:28:47,150 naca and then came to Marshall for the 546 00:28:55,100 --> 00:28:52,410 programs here with the Saturn programs 547 00:28:59,840 --> 00:28:55,110 in this type thing here and Charlie was 548 00:29:03,290 --> 00:28:59,850 a boy he was a stickler for details and 549 00:29:05,270 --> 00:29:03,300 he would give you the job he'd let you 550 00:29:08,900 --> 00:29:05,280 go off and work it when you come back 551 00:29:12,200 --> 00:29:08,910 he'd scrub you with a wire brush he'd 552 00:29:15,260 --> 00:29:12,210 asked every question that that he could 553 00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:15,270 think of and you had say he want to know 554 00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:17,970 where you get your data from where did 555 00:29:22,990 --> 00:29:20,370 you make your assumptions how did you 556 00:29:26,150 --> 00:29:23,000 know that's a good assumption he just 557 00:29:30,310 --> 00:29:26,160 looked at and picked it every detail of 558 00:29:33,050 --> 00:29:30,320 what he had but when you satisfied him 559 00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:33,060 he's ready to go because he was a 560 00:29:38,570 --> 00:29:37,050 harshest critic you had he was also the 561 00:29:44,450 --> 00:29:38,580 guy that the first time I made a 562 00:29:47,060 --> 00:29:44,460 presentation to a lab director here in 563 00:29:49,310 --> 00:29:47,070 town I'd been through that type of thing 564 00:29:53,290 --> 00:29:49,320 here and he'd scrubbed me and that's I 565 00:29:56,480 --> 00:29:53,300 think here and when I got up there the 566 00:29:59,740 --> 00:29:56,490 deputy lab director started in on my 567 00:30:02,990 --> 00:29:59,750 case every chart he had a bunch of 568 00:30:04,070 --> 00:30:03,000 questions to be asking about the third 569 00:30:06,290 --> 00:30:04,080 of four chart 570 00:30:08,600 --> 00:30:06,300 Charlie stood up back in the back of the 571 00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:08,610 room and told him says I've reviewed his 572 00:30:13,340 --> 00:30:11,130 presentation says I think it's in good 573 00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:13,350 shape I think he's gonna answer all your 574 00:30:19,250 --> 00:30:16,130 questions but in case he doesn't you 575 00:30:22,940 --> 00:30:19,260 cover him at the end and he pulled me 576 00:30:27,140 --> 00:30:22,950 off of me and pushing off being my I 577 00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:27,150 have never forgot it you know he was a 578 00:30:33,560 --> 00:30:31,170 guy that if you could satisfy him he'd 579 00:30:35,660 --> 00:30:33,570 stay with you and but but you had a 580 00:30:37,100 --> 00:30:35,670 satisfying cause he was gonna gonna 581 00:30:44,230 --> 00:30:37,110 probe you 582 00:30:52,029 --> 00:30:47,109 we were flying in the sixties we were 583 00:30:57,340 --> 00:30:52,039 flying the Saturday fives we were going 584 00:30:59,019 --> 00:30:57,350 to the moon and this thing of operations 585 00:31:01,509 --> 00:30:59,029 being different from the development 586 00:31:07,149 --> 00:31:01,519 that's a shuttle program that's I was 587 00:31:09,070 --> 00:31:07,159 not on Saturn program issue Apollo 588 00:31:13,299 --> 00:31:09,080 didn't do it that way we followed that 589 00:31:18,970 --> 00:31:13,309 thing we were looking at data on every 590 00:31:22,029 --> 00:31:18,980 flight and we had the people in hosk we 591 00:31:25,899 --> 00:31:22,039 got the data immediately we reviewed 592 00:31:29,399 --> 00:31:25,909 that data being NASA people we reviewed 593 00:31:33,879 --> 00:31:29,409 the data with our contractors and any 594 00:31:39,220 --> 00:31:33,889 problems we fixed a family fixed for the 595 00:31:45,880 --> 00:31:41,020 I felt a little bit about that but I'm 596 00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:45,890 not a great philosopher I consider 597 00:31:53,950 --> 00:31:48,610 myself an engineer we're solving 598 00:31:57,850 --> 00:31:53,960 problems and that when Apollo came along 599 00:32:01,090 --> 00:31:57,860 it was a solution to a problem 600 00:32:04,270 --> 00:32:01,100 and the the problem was that we had an 601 00:32:06,190 --> 00:32:04,280 edict from the president to put a man on 602 00:32:10,420 --> 00:32:06,200 the moon and bring him back safely in 603 00:32:15,220 --> 00:32:10,430 this decade it turns out that the world 604 00:32:20,100 --> 00:32:15,230 events the politics of the day and all 605 00:32:23,610 --> 00:32:20,110 just came together and with the people 606 00:32:29,650 --> 00:32:23,620 the Germans were a big portion of that 607 00:32:33,310 --> 00:32:29,660 they picked up a lot of good talent you 608 00:32:37,180 --> 00:32:33,320 know and education it affected education 609 00:32:40,750 --> 00:32:37,190 it affected kids going to school I think 610 00:32:45,730 --> 00:32:40,760 it captured a lot of the people's 611 00:32:50,020 --> 00:32:45,740 interest and it for that reason they was 612 00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:50,030 able to be successful now we did a lot 613 00:32:57,040 --> 00:32:54,770 of things that if we had a problem and 614 00:32:59,740 --> 00:32:57,050 we knew we needed to solve the problem 615 00:33:03,880 --> 00:32:59,750 we might start two or three programs 616 00:33:06,640 --> 00:33:03,890 that could potentially solve resolve 617 00:33:08,290 --> 00:33:06,650 that issue and it'd be signs of two or 618 00:33:11,050 --> 00:33:08,300 three different people and whoever got 619 00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:11,060 there is done first got to put theirs on 620 00:33:17,470 --> 00:33:13,130 a vehicle that creates a lot of 621 00:33:20,470 --> 00:33:17,480 competition cost probably money because 622 00:33:23,260 --> 00:33:20,480 they have funded money multiple streams 623 00:33:26,620 --> 00:33:23,270 so things here but schedule drove that 624 00:33:28,570 --> 00:33:26,630 and it's not you know want to get there 625 00:33:32,470 --> 00:33:28,580 someday you want to get there this 626 00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:32,480 decade and and it's a successful I 627 00:33:38,670 --> 00:33:34,970 thanked from the stack that we had a 628 00:33:43,270 --> 00:33:38,680 cold war that never turned to be hot and 629 00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:43,280 that we had competition there's such 630 00:33:48,730 --> 00:33:46,010 that I think the Europeans they lined up 631 00:33:51,910 --> 00:33:48,740 with the US and the lion 632 00:33:54,910 --> 00:33:51,920 the Soviets in this type of thing here I 633 00:33:57,850 --> 00:33:54,920 think from that standpoint it was 634 00:34:01,030 --> 00:33:57,860 successful but it was a moment in time 635 00:34:03,190 --> 00:34:01,040 that moment passed when we were 636 00:34:06,370 --> 00:34:03,200 successful on going to the moon and 637 00:34:10,419 --> 00:34:06,380 since 69 about that same time the 638 00:34:14,710 --> 00:34:10,429 Vietnam War began to heat up and they 639 00:34:17,680 --> 00:34:14,720 needed more money for the Vietnam War 640 00:34:20,050 --> 00:34:17,690 Apollo going to the moon was kind of 641 00:34:22,600 --> 00:34:20,060 finished it didn't need the bunny so 642 00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:22,610 there tried to turn that down turn the 643 00:34:30,550 --> 00:34:27,530 money up it's going to Vietnam so those 644 00:34:33,220 --> 00:34:30,560 are just things that in Vietnam catches 645 00:34:35,379 --> 00:34:33,230 the people's interest in that type of 646 00:34:37,840 --> 00:34:35,389 thing here so you got to have the 647 00:34:40,210 --> 00:34:37,850 commitment of the government you guys 648 00:34:43,720 --> 00:34:40,220 have a commitment of the interest of the 649 00:34:45,629 --> 00:34:43,730 people as the movie perfect storm it's 650 00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:45,639 probably that type of thing you know